Political Analysis : Yemen — From Euphoria to Disintegration

In part 3 of RO’s Arab Spring – 4 years series, the events in Yemen are analysed
Yemen4
The erup­tion of the Arab spring in Yemen back in 2011 is today a dis­tant mem­ory. Despite even­tu­ally push­ing Ali Abdul­lah Saleh from power after 33 years at the helm, he was replaced by his own crony Abd Rab­boh Mansur Hadi. The Houthis, who are a tribe from amongst the Zaidis, who fol­low Shi’ah fiqh com­prise 40% of the nations pop­u­la­tion and were big sup­port­ers of the 2011 Arab Spring upris­ing. The Houthis have fought the gov­ern­ment on-and-off dur­ing the 2000s, due to decades of being mar­gin­alised and repressed, but both Saleh and his replace­ment, Hadi, kept them from real power through dia­logues and inter­na­tion­ally spon­sored talks. Today Yemen is in chaos, the Houthis have entered into a pro­tracted strug­gle with the gov­ern­ment in Sanaa, over­throw­ing it in Sep­tem­ber 2014. Pres­i­dent Hadi has now fled the country[1] and now Saudi Ara­bia has launched airstrikes against reported Houthi tar­gets in the coun­tries capital.[2] Despite the demands of polit­i­cal change by the peo­ple, this small coun­try at south­ern tip of the Ara­bian Penin­sula is now the bat­tle ground for regional rivalry and inter­na­tional powers.
The trig­ger for the cur­rent ten­sions was the removal of fuel sub­si­dies in July 2014, which was a con­di­tionYemenMap by the IMF for the Yemeni gov­ern­ment to receive fur­ther loans. The IMFimposed the abol­ish­ment of the coun­tries sub­sidy sys­tem, even though half of the nation’s pop­u­la­tion lives in poverty.[3] The Houthis played a key role in the upris­ing against Saleh, but they have been sub­se­quently side­lined in the devel­op­ment of sub­se­quent tran­si­tional and then for­mal gov­ern­ments. With the price of fuel dou­bling this led to the Houthis set­ting up a protest camps in the cap­i­tal, Sanaa. These protest camps spread through the North of Yemen and around the cap­i­tal Sanaa. Pres­i­dent Hadi attempted to appease the Houthis with promises to review the sub­sidy cuts, but this was rejected by the Houthis. This led to the secu­rity forces shoot­ing dead many Houthi pro­test­ers, who were protest­ing out­side the cab­i­net build­ing in Sanaa.[4] As a result of this the Houthis moved towards the cap­i­tal, Sanaa in large num­bers from the moun­tains that sur­round the cap­i­tal and even­tu­ally took over gov­ern­ment build­ings. Pres­i­dent Hadi, sens­ing the dan­ger, signed the Peace and National Part­ner­ship Agree­ment, which gave more power to the Houthis in form­ing the gov­ern­ment includ­ing cab­i­net positions.[5] By Jan­u­ary 2015, with his pres­i­den­tial palace sur­rounded, a coup effec­tively took place, with the Houthis set­ting up a rev­o­lu­tion­ary gov­ern­ment in Sanaa and expand­ing to the South­ern port of Aden.
What strength­ened the Houthis has been sup­port from Iran. Iran has a pol­icy of sup­port­ing Shi’ah groups in the region in order expand its influ­ence and dom­i­nate the region. Iran has sup­plied weapons, money and train­ing to the Houthis which was crit­i­cal to their takeover of Yemen’s cap­i­tal in Sep­tem­ber 2014. The USSec­re­tary of State John Kerry con­firmed Iran ‘con­tributed’ to the Houthi takeover and the col­lapse of the Yemeni government.[6] The Houthis have been going to Iran and Lebanon for mil­i­tary train­ing and a senior Iran­ian offi­cial told Reuters that the Quds Force, the exter­nal arm of the Rev­o­lu­tion­ary Guard, had a ‘few hun­dred’ mil­i­tary per­son­nel in Yemen who train Houthi fight­ers. He con­firmed around 100 Houthis had trav­elled to Iran this year for train­ing at a Rev­o­lu­tion­ary Guards base near the city of Qom. The offi­cial said there were a dozen Iran­ian mil­i­tary advis­ers in Yemen, and the pace of money and arms get­ting to the Houthis had increased since their seizure of Sanaa.[7] This expan­sion of Iran­ian influ­ence and spread of Houthi con­trol right on Saudi Arabia’s bor­ders is what led it to bomb tar­gets in Yemen, espe­cially after Hadi fled the country.
The Houthis have also received inter­na­tional cover from the US. Senior US intel­li­gence offi­cial Michael Vick­ers con­firmed in Jan­u­ary 2015 that lines of intel­li­gence to the Houthis has been open for some time. Despite the Houthi takeover of Sanaa in Sep­tem­ber 2014: “the Houthis are anti al-Qaeda, and we’ve been able to con­tinue some of our coun­tert­er­ror­ism oper­a­tions against al-Qaeda in the past months.”[8] Charles Schmitz, an expert on Yemen at the Mid­dle East Insti­tute con­firmed: “the Houthis’ anti-al-Qaeda agenda, how­ever, in part a reac­tion to AQAP’s assas­si­na­tion of the cur­rent Houthi leader’s father, syn­chro­nizes nicely with both US and Iran­ian inter­ests in the same way that the United States, Iran and Iran-backed groups are on the same side in Iraq against the Islamic State group (IS).”[9] It was the US who pushed for Saleh to hand over power and step down when the upris­ings was in full swing in Yemen. But it was Britain and theEU that, for a long time, backed Saleh and his suc­ces­sor Hadi. The EU in a state­ment on 22 Sep 2014, when the Houthis took over Sanaa said: “Gov­ern­ment insti­tu­tions must return to the con­trol of the legit­i­mate author­i­ties, under the lead­er­ship of Pres­i­dent Abd Rabbo Man­sour Hadi, the Head of State.” The British ambas­sador to Yemen Jane Mar­riot con­firmed to Mid­dle East online in Sep­tem­ber 2014: “I do not have a direct rela­tion­ship with Ali Abdul­lah Saleh, but I com­mu­ni­cate with the Gen­eral People’s Con­gress includ­ing par­ties close to it.” She admit­ted her com­mu­ni­ca­tion with the party of Saleh and as he runs the party and has no rival or oppo­nent this would indi­cate she has been speak­ing reg­u­larly with Saleh. All of this shows there is inter­na­tional strug­gle to con­trol the polit­i­cal lead­ers of this strate­gi­cally impor­tant coun­try between Britain and the US, with US Iran­ian inter­ests align­ing and Saudi and UK inter­ests aligning.
Despite inter­na­tional cov­er­age of Yemen con­stantly being explained through a sec­tar­ian lens, the strug­gle within Yemen is a polit­i­cal one with dif­fer­ent fac­tions fight­ing for polit­i­cal power. It is not a sec­tar­ian strug­gle. The Houthis do appear to have bit­ten more than they can chew, with the takeover of the capi­tol and the south­ern parts of the coun­try. This is because despite the Houthis expand­ing its area of influ­ence and con­trol the areas it does con­trol and has done so  for months, they have not been able to main­tain order. Despite con­trol­ling most of the coun­try, the Houthi lead­er­ship con­tin­ues to call for new pres­i­den­tial elec­tions and a new par­lia­ment, indi­cat­ing they are merely look­ing for influ­ence in a new Yemen, but lack the capa­bil­ity to rule the coun­try itself. This lack of capa­bil­ity and ambi­tion is what has opened the Houthis to regional and for­eign agen­das. But their lack of polit­i­cal under­stand­ing can be seen from the fact that Ali Abdul­lah Saleh has been coop­er­at­ing with them, and his help, despite ris­ing up against him, has been wel­comed by the Houthi lead­er­ship. Al Jazeera con­firmed it received a leaked tape of a phone con­ver­sa­tion between Saleh and a Houthi leader coor­di­nat­ing tac­tics in Octo­ber 2014, after the fall of Sana’a.[10] A UN report in Feb­ru­ary 2015 con­cluded that Saleh “pro­vided direct sup­port” to the Houthis dur­ing their takeover of the cap­i­tal, order­ing his sup­port­ers not to impede their fight­ers and direct­ing his son, for­mer mil­i­tary com­man­der Ahmed Ali Saleh, to assist them in some capacity.[11]
The peo­ple of Yemen rose up to remove a bru­tal dic­ta­tor.  The upris­ing saw the col­lapse of gov­ern­ment insti­tu­tions and the army as many defected. How­ever real change did not take place in Yemen; only a trans­fer of power within the rul­ing elite occurred. The neglect of most of the coun­try by Saleh led to many rebel­lions and upris­ings in the coun­try. Saleh in the past dealt with many of them mil­i­tar­ily. How­ever the upris­ing in 2011 pre­sented Amer­ica with the oppor­tu­nity to inter­fere in Yemen and remove Saleh once and for all due to his loy­alty to Britain. Saleh has worked to main­tain the sta­tus quo through giv­ing con­ces­sions to all the var­i­ous fac­tions of the coun­try – whilst always main­tain­ing his posi­tion. No one regional or inter­na­tional power as well as domes­tic fac­tions has enough influ­ence to com­pletely change the bal­ance in their favor, so its expected some sort of deal will need to be made between them. Whilst the Houthis are best placed for such a deal, their lack of polit­i­cal under­stat­ing – the fact they are now work­ing with Ali Abdul­lah Saleh, who they ini­tially rose up against means both Saleh and Britain may get pro­por­tion­ally more than their influ­ence from any future deal.

[1] http://news.yahoo.com/report-rebels-seize-yemen-air-used-al-qaida-073203837.html
[2] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/26/saudi-arabia-begins-airstrikes-against-houthi-in-yemen
[3] http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/09/25/imf-yemen-idUKL6N0RQ2BB20140925
[4] http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/21443
[5] http://www.yementimes.com/en/1818/news/4365/Peace-and-National-Partnership-Agreement-signed.htm
[6] http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/02/24/Iran-contributed-to-collapse-of-Yemen-govt-Kerry.html
[7] http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/15/us-yemen-houthis-iran-insight-idUSKBN0JT17A20141215
[8] http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/01/yemen-houthis-obama-administration.html#ixzz3VX9Ndq7x
[9] http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/01/yemen-houthis-obama-administration.html#ixzz3VX9Ndq7x
[10] http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2014/10/23/Eyeing-return-Yemen-s-ousted-Saleh-helps-Houthis-.html and http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/01/audio-leak-ties-yemen-ex-leader-houthis-2015121175226439411.html
[11] http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/un-reports-reveals-collusion-between-ex-president-saleh-and-yemens-houthis-1718560512

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