Analysis : Egypt’s Military Posture

EgytMili

On Feb­ru­ary 14th the Russ­ian daily news­pa­per, Vedo­mosti, reported that Rus­sia and Egypt were near­ing a $3 bil­lion arms pur­chase agree­ment. This agree­ment is to be financed by Saudi Ara­bia and the United Arab Emi­rates. Despite decades of sig­nif­i­cant arms acqui­si­tions and its sig­nif­i­cant size, the Egypt­ian mil­i­tary is depen­dent on a large num­ber of out­dated weapons plat­forms. Its rela­tion­ship with the US has ren­dered its pos­ture inef­fec­tive in its region and turned it into an army bet­ter suited for inter­nal polic­ing than mount­ing intri­cate mil­i­tary oper­a­tions. Since ensu­ing peace with Israel in 1979, the Egypt­ian army has devoted the bal­ance of its focus on inter­nal secu­rity and main­tain­ing its dom­i­nant posi­tion in Egypt­ian pol­i­tics. The military’s pos­ture and focus, more so than its weapon plat­forms, need mod­ern­iza­tion and reorientation.

The Egypt­ian mil­i­tary has a force of 468,000 active per­son­nel and a reserve force of 479,000. It is a land-centric force, with the ground forces over­whelm­ingly dom­i­nat­ing the whole orga­ni­za­tion. Egypt’s armed forces equip­ment con­sists mainly of US equip­ment and older Soviet sys­tems; their 4,145 tanks are com­posed of 1,716 M60 Pat­tons from 1960, which came from excess Ger­man stocks left after reuni­fi­ca­tion and have under­gone numer­ous upgrades. Most of Egypt’s 1,130 US M1 Abrams tanks are not used and remain in stor­age. [1] For per­son­nel mobil­ity, Egypt’s inven­tory of Armoured Per­son­nel Car­ri­ers or APCs are from the Viet­nam era and con­sist of Soviet and US plat­forms. The ground forces’ mobil­ity is pos­si­ble through 2,447M113 APC’s, made by the US dur­ing the Viet­nam War. Shana Mar­shall of the Insti­tute of Mid­dle East Stud­ies at George Wash­ing­ton Uni­ver­sity high­lighted: “There’s no con­ceiv­able sce­nario in which they’d need all those tanks short of an alien inva­sion.” [2] For the small geog­ra­phy Egypt needs to defend, just 35% of the nation’s 1 mil­lion square kilo­me­ters is actu­ally inhab­ited. The size of Egypt’s ground forces is mas­sively dis­pro­por­tion­ate and a huge strain on the nation’s finances — this is the rea­son why there is a high pro­por­tion of aging equipment.

The Egypt­ian armed forces are dom­i­nated by its land forces and as a result its air force plays a small role in the over­all mil­i­tary pos­ture. Since 1977, it has seen vir­tu­ally no com­bat but has par­tic­i­pated in numer­ous exer­cises. Egypt’s com­bat air­crafts are dom­i­nated by 220 US F-16s of var­i­ous types  and 76 French Mirages from the 1960’s. In 1962, Egypt under­took a major pro­gram with the help of West Ger­man tech­ni­cians to design and build a super­sonic jet fighter; how­ever, the gov­ern­ment ter­mi­nated the project because of finan­cial strains caused by the 1967 Six Day War with Israel. Egypt has crashed more F-16s than any other oper­a­tor and the train­ing of its pilots is con­sid­ered by all experts as inad­e­quate. [3] The mil­i­tary there­after focused on co-production deals and pro­duc­ing weapons sys­tems on license. This involves the assem­bling of kits pro­vided by for­eign coun­tries, but in Egypt’s case, no tech­nol­ogy trans­fer has taken place, espe­cially for its key­stone sys­tems, i.e. M1 Abrams tank and  the F-16 Fight­ing Falcon.

The Egypt­ian Navy (EN) was set up in the 1960’s and was largely neglected for more than a decade. The major­ity of the navy was cre­ated with the help of the Soviet Union and received ships in the 1980s from China and the West. The navy and coast guard cur­rently con­sist of 221 ships and crafts, as well as 4 Romeo class sub­marines, which are a class of Soviet diesel-electric sub­marines built in the 1950s. The Soviet Union only com­pleted 20 of the 56 sub­marines that they intended to build between Octo­ber 1957 and Decem­ber 1961 because of the intro­duc­tion of nuclear sub­marines into the Soviet Navy. By today’s stan­dards, Romeo class sub­marines are con­sid­ered obso­lete, but they still have some value as train­ing and sur­veil­lance ves­sels. Con­sid­er­ing the fact that Egypt has a coast­line of 2000km to pro­tect, it has a dis­pro­por­tion­ately small navy.

The Egypt­ian Armed forces are highly politi­cised, which has dis­tracted it from its role of national secu­rity. As a result,  the army lead­er­ship has focused on main­tain­ing the army’s role in the econ­omy and its eco­nomic inter­ests rather than devel­op­ing a highly trained force with the capa­bil­ity to wage war. There­fore, the mil­i­tary has played a cen­tral role in pro­tect­ing US inter­ests in the region. Ever since the mil­i­tary coup in 1952, the US has show­ered the Egypt­ian mil­i­tary with bribe money (aid) in excess of $30 bil­lion to main­tain the bal­ance of power in the region, par­tic­u­larly through nor­mal­iz­ing rela­tions with Israel. [4]  The greater the role the US has taken in build­ing up and sus­tain­ing Egypt’s army the greater the influ­ence Amer­ica has had on Egypt’s pos­ture. That influ­ence has trans­lated into mak­ing Egypt a man­power and resource inten­sive force, which has ensured that Wash­ing­ton main­tains con­trol over the country’s strate­gic and deci­sive capabilities.

Whilst Egypt’s forces are con­sid­ered the strongest when mea­sured rel­a­tively to the nations of Africa and the Mid­dle East, this met­ric does not encap­su­late the fact that the region’s mil­i­taries are gen­er­ally weak and lack capa­bil­ity. The Egypt­ian forces pur­pose, pos­ture, doc­trine and capa­bil­i­ties are com­pletely out of sync with what it can and should achieve. It pos­sesses one of the largest armies in the world, yet is required to defend a rel­a­tively small area of pop­u­lated and strate­gi­cally sig­nif­i­cant ter­ri­tory . This large force, rather than pos­ture towards offen­sive oper­a­tions, is com­pletely internal-centric, designed to main­tain the army’s hold on the nation. Its only exter­nal focus is to pro­tect US inter­ests by pro­tect­ing Israel. Every year, the USCon­gress appro­pri­ates more than $1 bil­lion in mil­i­tary aid to Egypt. But that money never gets to Egypt. It goes to the Fed­eral Reserve Bank of New York then to a trust fund at the Trea­sury and, finally, out to USmil­i­tary con­trac­tors that make the tanks and fighter jets that ulti­mately get sent to Egypt. [5] Whether it’s from the US or Rus­sia, Egypt’s cur­rent mil­i­tary pos­ture will only main­tain this sce­nario no mat­ter how much mil­i­tary equip­ment it purchases.

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