Analysis : Beasts of the Seas — Aircraft Carriers

If there is a piece of mil­i­tary equip­ment that clearly cements the rise of a major power, it is an air­craft car­rier. Amongst the largest and heav­i­est ships for the navies that pos­sess them, air­craft car­ri­ers are long-range ves­sels that can carry, arm, launch and recover air­craft. There are mul­ti­ple types of air­craft car­ri­ers, some spe­cial­iz­ing in exclu­sively car­ry­ing heli­copters, and oth­ers capa­ble of oper­at­ing fighter air­craft. The lat­ter (i.e. fighter-capable car­ri­ers) are of par­tic­u­lar inter­est since they are larger and more com­plex designs but more impor­tantly, demon­strate a country’s capac­ity and will­ing­ness to mil­i­tar­ily pur­sue cross-regional and global interests.

The hand­ful of coun­tries that oper­ate fighter-capable air­craft car­ri­ers include the United States, the United King­dom, France, Rus­sia, China, India, Italy and Brazil. The US is the largest and most pow­er­ful oper­a­tor by a very wide-margin. It pos­sesses a fleet of 10 active Nimitz Class car­ri­ers, each weigh­ing roughly 100,000 tons and pow­ered by two nuclear reac­tors and hous­ing close to 90 air­craft of mul­ti­ple types, the most numer­ous being fight­ers (i.e. F/A-18 Hor­nets).[1] Put into per­spec­tive, a sin­gle Nimitz Class car­rier has more mil­i­tary air­craft than most indi­vid­ual coun­tries.[2]
Air­craft car­ri­ers have played an inte­gral role in all of America’s major mil­i­tary offen­sives around the world, espe­cially in its inva­sions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, respec­tively. From a strate­gic stand­point, air­craft car­ri­ers offer coun­tries the capa­bil­ity to deploy fighter air­craft to dis­tant lands with­out the need of hav­ing nearby air bases (in the short-term). Air­craft car­ri­ers have allowed the US to respond to mat­ters of major mil­i­tary inter­est within a rel­a­tively short period of time, requir­ing days and weeks as opposed to months of mobi­liza­tion. For exam­ple, the USS Carl Vin­son was deployed for com­bat against Afghanistan only a month after the Sep­tem­ber 11th attacks.[3]

This level of capa­bil­ity does come at an immense finan­cial cost. Fighter-capable car­ri­ers them­selves are expen­sive ships, typ­i­cally start­ing from $2bn for India[4] and reach­ing up to $13bn per ves­sel for the US.[5]More­over, given their spe­cial­ized nature, car­ri­ers do not travel the oceans on their own but as a con­stituent part of a Car­rier Strike Group (CSG). They must be pro­tected by a fleet con­sist­ing of anti-ship, anti-submarine and anti-air capa­ble ships such as frigates and destroy­ers. Such fleets must be sup­ported by aux­il­iary and re-supply ves­sels. Thus, a sin­gle carrier-fleet would cost a coun­try tens of bil­lions of dol­lars at the min­i­mum to sim­ply acquire, let alone main­tain and upgrade.
The costly nature of build­ing and main­tain­ing a car­rier fleet has not gone unno­ticed, even in the United States. Cap­tain Henry Hen­drix of the U.S Navy argued that the value of con­ven­tional  air­craft car­ri­ers (such as the Nimitz and the lat­est USS Ger­ald R. Ford) has dimin­ished and con­tin­ues to dimin­ish in light of mod­ern weapon-systems such as long-range anti-ship mis­siles, satel­lite imagery and smaller, but faster, ships (such as mis­sile boats).[6] Hen­drix argues that an evo­lu­tion of car­ri­ers involv­ing the devel­op­ment of amphibi­ous assault ships capa­ble of oper­at­ing unmanned air­craft (instead of com­mit­ted car­ri­ers) is nec­es­sary in order to con­trol costs, increase sur­viv­abil­ity and main­tain the lethal­ity of Amer­i­can naval fleets. Nonethe­less, the neces­sity of main­tain­ing capa­ble air­craft assets from the open seas is still recognized.
 
Ships of this nature (con­ven­tional car­ri­ers or amphibi­ous car­ri­ers) are char­ac­ter­is­tic of “blue-water” navies, i.e. navies capa­ble of oper­at­ing in the open seas and long-distances away from the home­land. Only three coun­tries have fully real­ized blue-water navies, the US, Britain and France. Rus­sia, China, India, Japan and South Korea are in the process of building-up to that sta­tus, with China and India in the process of com­mis­sion­ing new fighter-equipped carriers.

China: The PLA Navy’s Liaon­ingis a refur­bished and mod­ern­ized Admi­ral Kuznetsov Class car­rier acquired from Rus­sia. The near-60,000 ton Liaon­ing is China’s first fully oper­a­tional air­craft car­rier and it is equipped with J-15 (indi­g­e­nized vari­a­tion of the Russ­ian Su-27) fight­ers. China is cur­rently in the process of con­struct­ing a sec­ond, but larger, air­craft car­rier of an indige­nous design.[7]

India: The Indian Navy recently com­mis­sioned the INS Vikra­ma­ditya, a refur­bished and mod­ern­ized Russ­ian air­craft car­rier (i.e. Kiev Class — Admi­ral Gor­shkov). The 45,000 ton car­rier is equipped with 24 MiG-29 fight­ers along­side 10 heli­copters. The Vikra­ma­dityawill be aug­mented by two indige­nously built car­ri­ers of the Vikrant Class, the first of which (Vikrant) was recently launched and expected to enter ser­vice with the Indian Navy in 2016–2017.[8]
There are three observ­able char­ac­ter­is­tics of coun­tries pos­sess­ing blue-water navies with fighter-equipped air­craft car­ri­ers. First, they are pow­ers with global and/or cross-regional inter­ests of vital mil­i­tary impor­tance. The United States is the most obvi­ous exam­ple with regards to its inva­sions of Iraq and Afghanistan but also its naval pres­ence in the Far East, a move aimed at con­tain­ing China.
Sec­ond, these capa­bil­i­ties are home­grown, i.e. the coun­try in ques­tion must pos­sess and use exten­sive indus­trial prowess in order to acquire a fully-capable blue-water fleet. While it is true that China and India’s cur­rent car­ri­ers are mod­ern­ized Russ­ian plat­forms, the two coun­tries are heav­ily engaged in build­ing indige­nous designs.
Third, coun­tries with blue-water navies are not defen­sive in pos­ture. The US and UK view them­selves as play­ers of mat­ters beyond their bor­ders and imme­di­ate sur­round­ings. They are ‘out­ward fac­ing’ states who use their naval capa­bil­i­ties to assert their inter­ests and to con­trol the affairs of other states and regions. The broader its vision, the more pow­er­ful the country’s naval capa­bil­i­ties. Thus, we see the United States as the dom­i­nant naval power in the world.
 
Not a sin­gle coun­try in the Mus­lim world pos­sesses an air­craft car­rier nor is any­where near hav­ing the indus­trial capac­ity to build one that is com­pa­ra­ble to the ones under con­struc­tion in India (much less the United States). Turkey is the only Mus­lim coun­try to pos­sess a par­tial blue-water navy, and it is the clos­est (and like­li­est) from amongst the pow­ers in the Mus­lim world to build or acquire a car­rier. Nonethe­less, this is but one exam­ple (among many) as to how the gov­ern­ments rul­ing the Mus­lim world are nei­ther inter­ested nor capa­ble of fac­ing out­ward. They are inca­pable of man­ag­ing the issues that require their atten­tion, and thus the Mus­lim world will remain an object for oth­ers to shape as opposed to a proac­tive power.


[2]http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2012/12/free-download-world-air-forces    
[4]http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/16/india-aircraft-carrier-russia-rivalry-china
[7]http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/24/us-china-navy-carrier-idUSBRE93N00Q20130424

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